



William J. Clinton

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Briefing Materials

John Shalikashvili
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GENERAL JOHN SHALIKASHVILI NEWS TIMELINE

Prepared by BJ Bloom

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- 1958** John Shalikashvili earns his bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from Bradley University. One month earlier, Shalikashvili and his family are sworn in as American citizens, it is the first citizenship he has ever held. He had previously been a refugee who had only been classified as "stateless," since he had been born to parents who had been refugees. (*The Washington Post*, 11/21/1993)
- 1959** Shalikashvili receives his commission as a second lieutenant in the United States Army after graduating from Officer Candidate School. (*The Washington Post*, 11/21/1993)
- 1961-1967** Deciding to make a career in the Army, Shalikashvili serves as an instructor (1961-1963) and staff officer (1963-1964) at the Army Air Defense School and Center in Fort Bliss, Texas, and then joins the 32nd Army Air Defense Command in Germany (1965-1967). He is promoted to captain in 1963 and becomes a major in 1967.
- 1968** Shalikashvili begins an eighteen-month assignment as Senior Advisor in the Trieu Phong district, Advisory Team 19, with the United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. Shalikashvili's responsibilities include training local militia, as well as working with officials on rice production and other civilian economic and political tasks. (*The Washington Post*, 11/21/1993)
- 1970** Shalikashvili receives a master's degree in international relations from George Washington University.
- 1983** Shalikashvili is promoted to brigadier general.
- 1986** Shalikashvili is promoted to major general.
- 1989** Shalikashvili serves in Germany as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Europe.
- 1991** In order to provide assistance to the Iraqi Kurdish minority following the Persian Gulf War, President George Bush organizes an international relief expedition to serve in what is identified as Operation Provide Comfort. Shalikashvili, a lieutenant general since 1989, is named commander. The operation, which has as its stated goals the provision of humanitarian aid and the establishment of a safe haven for the Kurds in northern Iraq, lasts until July and is perceived as a *success*.

Following his service in the Middle East, Shalikashvili reports to the Pentagon as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Colin Powell.

1992

June Shalikashvili becomes both Supreme Allied Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Allied Commander for NATO forces.

1993

March Congress decrees that U.S. forces in Europe be cut back to 100,000 troops by 1996 from the peak of 324,000 in 1990. With just 150,000 troops left, Shalikashvili expresses concern for their morale, but is confident that the streamlined U.S. fighting force will be able to fulfill any mission, provided that its quality remains high. (*The Washington Post*, 03/28/1993)

August President William J. Clinton nominates Shalikashvili to replace General Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Powell will step down on September 30, and Shalikashvili, pending Senate confirmation, will replace him as the highest-ranking military official in the U.S. While the chairman role generally shifts through the various military divisions, Clinton decides to replace one Army general with another, rather than going with an Air Force general, since it is their "turn" in the cycle. (*The Washington Post*, 08/12/1993)

The press reports that Shalikashvili's father fought in World War II in a Nazi-organized unit commanded by the Waffen-SS. Defense Secretary Les Aspin issues a statement supporting the nominee, echoing comments made by several members of Congress and Administration officials. "Gen. John Shalikashvili's superb record of achievement in the U.S. Army speaks for itself" Aspin states. "Allegations about his father's history are not relevant." (*The New York Times*, 08/28/1993)

September Shalikashvili gives strong support for sending 25,000 American troops to Bosnia to help enforce any peace settlement reached there, but says the overall operation would cost \$4 billion in the first year alone. He states in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that a force of 50,000 heavily armed NATO troops would have a good chance of success in such a mission if the proper command structure was established and the warring factions committed themselves to observe an agreement. (*The New York Times*, 09/23/1993)

December Following North Korea's announcement that they will no longer allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect their nuclear facilities, Clinton contemplates diplomatic solutions to the problem, including increasing U.S. sanctions against the regime. Concerned that diplomacy may fail to resolve the standoff with North Korea, Clinton asks Shalikashvili and Secretary Aspin to personally review with him the Pentagon's plans to defend South Korea, including whether to bolster U.S. and South Korean forces along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Shalikashvili later comments that if the regime was "foolish enough to attack" South Korea over disputes about Pyongyang's nuclear program, he is "very, very confident" that allied forces could repel the invaders "far short of their reaching their war objectives." (*The New York Times*, 12/02/1993; *The Washington Post*, 12/15/1993)

1994

January Ahead of an upcoming NATO summit in Brussels, Clinton sends Shalikashvili and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Madeleine K. Albright to Eastern Europe to try to dissuade the former Soviet bloc countries from demanding immediate NATO membership. The two travel to the capitals of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in hopes of persuading Eastern European leaders to endorse a proposed arrangement of military ties called the Partnership for Peace. Clinton wants the countries to agree to the Partnership for Peace program as a slower process of integration and sends his envoys to try to reduce the chances for embarrassment, should the Eastern European countries refuse to enter into the Partnership for Peace program. Shalikashvili tells reporters that extending NATO's security guarantees too rapidly to the Eastern Europeans could prompt a nationalistic backlash in an excluded Russia: "The reason that partnership is defined as it is is to avoid at all costs the establishment of a new line, a new division that, in turn then, would create new tensions and fuel new conflicts." (*The Washington Post*, 01/04/1994, 01/05/1994)

February Shalikashvili and Defense Secretary William J. Perry take a public stance against the proposed balanced budget amendment. The two top Administration military officials tell Congress that the amendment would probably force large and immediate cuts in the discretionary portion of the federal budget, about half of which goes toward Pentagon programs. Perry suggests the amendment "would have a devastating effect on our ability to maintain an adequate defense structure." (*The New York Times*, 02/09/1994)

March As the Bosnian conflict expands and U.S. troops withdraw from Somalia, Shalikashvili publicly remarks that the American public and Congress need to be better informed about potential casualties in future

peacekeeping operations. Noting that political support for keeping American troops in Somalia collapsed after the death in October of 19 servicemen in a Mogadishu firefight, Shalikashvili tells reporters that the U.S. public is not yet prepared for more casualties should ground forces be dispatched to Bosnia. "I don't think the American public today is sold on" U.S. participation in a Bosnia peacekeeping operation, Shalikashvili states. "I think we have an awful lot of explaining to do still." He indicates his own support for a NATO peacekeeping contingent in Bosnia of as many as 50,000 troops --half of them drawn from U.S. forces -- provided Bosnia's Muslims, Croats and Serbs reach a peace agreement. (*The Washington Post*, 03/10/1994)

Albright and Shalikashvili travel to Sarajevo to show support for the mostly Muslim Bosnian government, pledging financial aid and possibly U.S. ground troops to enforce a peace settlement. In meetings with British army Lt. Gen. Michael Rose, the commander of the UN operation in Bosnia, Shalikashvili stresses that any U.S. military participation in Bosnia would have to be under NATO command and that UN command of the operation would be unacceptable. (*The Washington Post*, 03/31/1994)

April

A surprise attack by Bosnian Serbs on Gorazde, a Muslim enclave designated as one of four "safe areas" declared by the UN Security Council in 1993, provokes a dispute within the Administration on an appropriate military response by NATO. Shalikashvili and Perry quickly and publicly announce there will be no NATO bombings on Serb positions, but national security advisor Anthony Lake, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University, does not rule out the possibility of bombings. Lake says, "Let me be clear. Neither the President nor any of his senior advisers rules out the use of air power to help stop attacks such as those against Gorazde." The press views this as a veiled criticism of Shalikashvili and Perry's previous remarks. Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher believe such signals undercut the Administration's strategy of marrying the State Department's diplomatic effort to bring peace to Bosnia with the threat of force. (*The New York Times*, 04/08/1994)

Despite the disagreement among Pentagon officials, NATO begins a bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb positions near Gorazde. The attacks mark the first time that air power has been used against Serbian positions in Bosnia, as well as the first time in the 45-year history of the NATO alliance that it has ever carried out a bombing raid. It also represents an important milestone for the Clinton Administration. The media argues that with this strike, NATO has not only demonstrated its determination to protect UN personnel under fire and taken action to protect the 65,000 people trapped in Gorazde, but It has also refocused

the debate over the use of air power in Bosnia that has divided Administration officials. (*The New York Times*, 04/11/1994)

Two U.S. fighter jets patrolling over northern Iraq misidentify two U.S. Army helicopters and destroy them with missiles, killing fifteen Americans and eleven other passengers. The incident comes at a time of increasing tension in the area established by allied forces three years ago to protect Iraq's persecuted Kurdish minority after the Persian Gulf War. There have been terrorist attacks by suspected Iraqi saboteurs, a flurry of repositioning just south of the area by Iraq's Republican Guard, and a rise in bellicose rhetoric by President Saddam Hussein in the wake of the UN decision last month to continue economic sanctions against Iraq. (*The Washington Post*, 04/15/1994)

Two senior UN officials argue that the United States is partly to blame for the continuation of the war in Bosnia because it has given the Muslim-led Bosnian government the false impression of Washington's military support. The civil affairs official accuses the United States of leading the Muslims on by sending Shalikashvili to Bosnia to attend a ceremony opening the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. During his visit, Shalikashvili met with Bosnian military leaders in a move that the official says was interpreted by the Muslim-led government as a powerful incentive to continue fighting. (*The Washington Post*, 04/30/1994)

May

Shalikashvili comes under scrutiny when a memo he writes to Perry advocating restriction of certain aviation missions for women is leaked to *The Washington Post*. Shalikashvili writes to Perry that the "unique aviation missions" involved in carrying special operations troops -- which "require low altitude flights and landing, often remaining deep behind enemy lines" -- justify excluding female pilots. The memo infuriates many female military officers who see it as an illustration of how military leaders intend to search for as many escape hatches as possible from a new Administration policy that calls for opening up virtually all jobs to women except those that involve direct ground combat. (*The Washington Post*, 05/07/1994)

The Clinton Administration decides to accept a North Korean request for new high-level negotiations aimed at resolving U.S. concerns over their nuclear program, including its withdrawal of spent fuel from a nuclear reactor in defiance of international inspectors. The White House meeting on policy towards North Korea involves Shalikashvili, Christopher, Perry, Albright, Lake, and Robert Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State and head of the Administration's senior steering group on Korea. The Clinton Administration had previously said it would not participate in new negotiations if North Korea did not allow

a satisfactory inspection of its withdrawal of spent nuclear reactor fuel. North Korea keeps to its longstanding position in the inspection dispute. (*The Washington Post*, 05/21/1994)

July President Clinton orders the Pentagon to mount an enormous, urgent airlift to funnel relief supplies from around the world into Africa in an attempt to control the catastrophe facing more than a million Rwandan refugees now in Zaire. Shalikashvili describes the American relief mission as "a race against time." Clinton also calls on the UN to move as quickly as possible to deploy an international peacekeeping force to stabilize Rwanda and persuade refugees to return home. The Pentagon says that it expects to commit about 1,500 troops to the airlift, most of them in Africa, but that beyond security at the airfields, they would not be part of the peacekeeping force, which is being drawn largely from Africa. (*The New York Times*, 07/23/1994)

August Shalikashvili testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the issue of whether to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention President Bush signed in 1993. Several senators say they believe the U.S. possession of chemical weapons may be the best persuasion against others using them, and question whether the treaty could be verified. However, Shalikashvili assures skeptical senators that U.S. conventional weapons are so overwhelming that even nations that keep chemical weapons would be unlikely to use them in a war for fear of American retaliation. (*The Washington Post*, 08/12/1994)

September U.S. forces land in Haiti in Operation Uphold Democracy, as a means for overthrowing the military leaders of Haiti and restoring exiled President Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. As the U.S. soldiers unload equipment, Haitian police openly attack supporters of Aristide, who have gathered near the port to cheer on the U.S. invasion. U.S. officials in Washington say practical realities limit their ability to do anything about the demonstrations and state that U.S. policy is for American forces to avoid intervening in such incidents unless there is an overall threat to "civil order." "We are not in a business of doing the day-to-day law and order, for that matter resolving or quelling any demonstrations, unless these demonstrations or this level of violence becomes so great that it threatens the overall stability and the security of our multinational forces, and then we will intercede," says Shalikashvili. (*The Washington Post*, 09/21/1994)

The Administration appears to shift its policy on controlling the violence in Haiti, stating that American troops may now act in emergency situations to stop brutality they witness. Perry, appearing with Aristide at the Pentagon, says more than 1,000 military police will be present in Haiti with "the specific function of overseeing and

monitoring the functioning of the Haiti police force to ensure that they do not use unreasonable restraint in trying to deal with crowd-control problems." Many media critics point to this confusion in simple security policy as emblematic of the general disarray in the Haitian operation, with poorly articulated goals and indecision by Clinton as to how and when to proceed with the operation. (*The Washington Post*, 09/22/1994)

October

In response to Iraqi troop movements near the Kuwaiti border, Clinton puts thousands of Marine and Army troops on alert and orders a massive U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. Four days later, Iraqi troops and heavy weapons are seen moving north away from the Kuwaiti border region in what U.S. officials describe as a partial pullback, but the U.S. continues its military buildup in Kuwait and neighboring Saudi Arabia. Shalikashvili says that U.S. intelligence has detected "fairly broad movement in most of those units that had been brought down south." At a Pentagon news conference, however, he cautions that "there is still an indication of considerable units still remaining. We do not have any indication as to where the units are preparing to move and so we are continuing to watch the situation very carefully, and at the same time we are continuing with the deployments." (*The Washington Post*, 10/08/1994, 10/12/1994)

November

In an interview on CNN's "Evans and Novak," incoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC), when asked whether Clinton is "up to the job" of commander-in-chief, says, "No I do not. And neither do the people in the armed forces." The Senator suggests that many in the military, including some senior officers, share his negative regard for Clinton's competence, saying this frequently is reflected in the letters he receives from military personnel. Shalikashvili responds by saying, "I do not share that view. I have been with the President in difficult deliberations and have always found him able to understand the issues, ask the tough questions and make the hard decisions." Shalikashvili also issues a statement saying, "President Clinton is our commander-in-chief. He has and will continue to have the loyalty and full support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" (*The Washington Post*, 11/20/1994)

1995

January

The House Appropriations Subcommittee on National Security meets with Perry and Shalikashvili for three hours to discuss the Pentagon budget. Since taking control of Congress, leading Republican legislators have sent conflicting messages about defense spending. (*The Washington Post*, 01/26/1995)

April

Amidst a breakdown in the cease-fire in Bosnia, Clinton's top foreign policy advisors meet to discuss the possibility of a UN withdrawal and whether to reconsider old plans to strengthen the peacekeepers with U.S.-supplied heavy weapons. Shalikashvili, Christopher, Lake, and Deputy Defense Secretary John M. Deutch meet at the Pentagon to review both options. The reinforcement plan was approved by senior advisors in February, but rejected by NATO allies France and Britain, whose troops make up the bulk of the peacekeeping force. Clinton also faces growing pressure from Republican legislators to reinforce Bosnian Muslims' arms against the more heavily-armed Serbs. A group of key GOP senators, including Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS), write Clinton a letter stating that the United States ought to "explicitly" condition help in evacuating the peacekeepers on allied support for exempting the Muslims from a UN arms embargo. In the view of Dole and other critics, the embargo has only served to cripple the government's war effort against the better-armed Serbs, regarded as carrying on a criminal war of aggression. (*The Washington Post*, 04/29/1995)

May

Deutch is sworn in as the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), replacing R. James Woolsey. While Woolsey was not considered an Administration insider, in a closed-circuit television press conference to CIA staff members, Deutch emphasizes his close personal relationships with several of Clinton's foreign policy advisers, including Shalikashvili. Officials say Deutch has decided to break with tradition by appointing as his deputy someone who has spent more time on Capitol Hill than in the intelligence community: George J. Tenet, who was Staff Director of the Senate Intelligence Committee under then-Sen. David L. Boren (D-OK) before becoming Clinton's National Security Council Senior Director for Intelligence Programs in 1993. (*The Washington Post*, 05/12/1995)

June

Clinton and his aides seek to reassure the Senate and public that the U.S. would not necessarily be sending in ground troops to Bosnia following a commencement speech Clinton gave at the Air Force Academy, saying that he would allow U.S. troops to help British, French and other troops under the UN flag regroup inside Bosnia. With the exception of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), who issued a two-sentence statement of support, virtually no one in Congress, of either party, endorsed the President's decision and several members were strongly critical. In phone calls to members of Congress and in news briefings, senior officials emphasize that no U.S. ground troops will be sent into Bosnia for any reason without extensive congressional consultation. They also say the United States will not participate in a "rapid response force" being set up by Britain and France to support their contingents in the UN force. Perry and Shalikashvili will attend a Paris meeting at which nations whose

peacekeeping troops have come under increasing attack by Serb forces will discuss their next steps there. (*The Washington Post*, 06/02/1995)

Bosnian Serbs reportedly shoot down an American F-16 jet fighter. The White House upbraids the Bosnian Serbs, calling them "outcasts and international pariahs," on the same day Serbs reportedly release 120 UN peacekeepers that had been held hostage. White House Press Secretary Michael D. McCurry applauds the reported release of the hostages but also demands that the rest of the hostages, who number more than 200, be freed at once. The events cloud Clinton's meeting at the White House with Perry and Shalikashvili to discuss future American actions in the region. (*The New York Times*, 06/03/1995)

Shalikashvili and Perry testify before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the new U.S. policy on the European rapid deployment force in Bosnia. Their effort at clarity is only partly successful as the two differ in their descriptions of when U.S. ground troops may be used in an evacuation of UN troops. Shalikashvili says such troops could be used only after a full withdrawal of peacekeepers was underway, whereas Perry clarifies that the Administration also would consider sending such troops in briefly for emergency rescues. Members of both parties warn Perry that the mood in Congress is to restrict the use of U.S. troops in Bosnia. Leading Democrats admonish Clinton to seek congressional approval, by vote and not mere consultation, before allowing troops to be used in any manner. "I've never thought very much of this word 'consultation,' says Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), the Senate Appropriations Committee's ranking minority member. The advice is shared by the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, Sen. Sam Nunn (GA). Perry states "the President has not yet made a decision" about seeking a congressional vote on the use of force. "It will depend on the circumstances." (*The Washington Post*, 06/08/1995)

July Clinton nominates Shalikashvili for a second two-year term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calling him a "shining symbol of what is best about the United States and best about our armed forces." (*The Washington Post*, 07/01/1995)

The fall of Srebrenica, a UN-protected enclave in Bosnia, throws the future of the UN mission in Bosnia into jeopardy, according to senior American and Western European officials. Military commanders express concern over heightened risks to U.S. and NATO forces by Bosnian Serbs emboldened by their victory and by the fact that they escaped punishment for shooting down Capt. Scott O'Grady, an American pilot, last month. "We are now at a point where we need to balance the safety of pilots, NATO pilots flying in this operation, against the damage that would be

done should we terminate it," Shalikashvili tells the House National Security Committee. The day's events prompt Senator Bob Dole to vow to press for a quick vote on a measure to dissociate the U.S. from the UN arms embargo on Bosnia. But French President Jacques Chirac warns that a unilateral American decision to ignore the arms embargo on Bosnia to allow the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to buy heavy weapons would lead to an immediate withdrawal of the UN forces. (*The New York Times*, 07/12/1995)

Shalikashvili meets in London with his French and British counterparts, Adm. Jacques Lanxade and Field Marshall Sir Peter Inge, to discuss the possibilities for reinforcing the Gorazde "safe area" in eastern Bosnia. Tensions among the allies -- and between British and French officials in particular -- escalates after President Chirac calls for military action to retake Srebrenica and the British respond with sharp criticism. A rapid reaction force being assembled by the French, British and others for such tasks is said to be about one-quarter deployed, lacking the artillery and transport capability needed to make it effective. The U.S., unwilling to commit ground troops, leaves open the possibility of airlifting in French troops, since the U.S. is the only NATO force with the transport facilities to carry out such a mission. In his memoir, Clinton says, "The London conference was a turning point; from then on, NATO would be much more assertive." (Bill Clinton, *My Life*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, p. 666; *The Washington Post*, 07/17/1995, 07/18/1995)

September At the Senate confirmation hearing for Shalikashvili, the Republicans surprise the Administration in the breadth of their opposition to sending any U.S. troops to Bosnia to secure the peace deal that is being brokered between the waning parties. Two years ago Clinton said that in the event of a peace settlement in Bosnia, the U.S. would send as many as 25,000 troops --half the proposed 50,000-member NATO-led force -- to patrol new borders, protect relief workers and generally enforce the accord. He also promised that he would consult with Congress before sending ground troops. However, throughout Shalikashvili's confirmation hearing, many powerful Republican senators express their anger at the perceived non-cooperation between the Administration and Congress in formulating policy on troop levels after the peace agreement. If the United States fails to play an active role in monitoring a peace plan, Shalikashvili warns, Washington's credibility with NATO allies will plunge and throw the alliance into chaos. "We cannot come in and out of the alliance and choose to lead when it's to our benefit and let them take the lead when we don't wish to." In his memoir, Richard Holbrooke writes, "It was fortunate for the Administration that the first person to testify on American troop deployments was Shalikashvili, rather than a civilian; his low-key style and ramrod bearing, combined with his unquestionable patriotism and integrity, made him the most

credible witness we could have." (Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, New York: Random House, 1998, p. 173; *The New York Times*, 09/22/1995)

October Shalikashvili travels to Sarajevo to encourage the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats in Bosnia to comply with the three-day old cease-fire, despite continued fighting in northwestern Bosnia. The Serbs have threatened to pull out of peace talks, scheduled to start on October 31 in the U.S., if the Muslim-Croat attacks continue. "I think any fighting is a serious threat to the cease-fire," says Shalikashvili, on arriving in Sarajevo. (*The Washington Post*, 10/15/1995)

November On the final day of the Bosnia peace talks, at President Clinton's insistence, U.S. negotiators receive letters from Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian leaders guaranteeing the security of NATO peacekeeping troops. U.S. officials are relying on Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to secure a similar pact from the Bosnian Serbs, whom Milosevic represents in the Dayton talks. An American negotiator says that Shalikashvili has told Milosevic that it would be impossible to deploy U.S. troops in Bosnia without consent of the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic replies that he understands the U.S. concern, and will make sure that a Bosnian Serb representative put his name on the peace agreement when it is signed in Paris in mid-December. (*The Washington Post*, 11/24/1995)

1996

February Clinton signs into law a \$256 billion military budget bill but directs the Attorney General not to defend in court a provision requiring the Pentagon to discharge troops who have HIV. The White House announcement caps a ten-day period in which the Administration struggled to find a way to sign the major military bill, a version of which Mr. Clinton vetoed in December for a number of reasons, while keeping the support of gay rights proponents and advocates for AIDS patients in an election year. Shalikashvili, during a Senate Armed Services Committee on a defense budget hearing, denounces the newly enacted law that would force out service members who test positive for HIV. (*The New York Times*, 02/10/1996, 03/06/1996)

With the deployment of American troops to Bosnia amidst three million land mines, and already seeing injuries for U.S. soldiers, Shalikashvili orders a review of the military's longstanding opposition to banning the use of land mines. Only a few months earlier, Shalikashvili testified before the House and Senate to defeat a bill proposed by Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT) that would ban the use of land mines by the U.S., citing land mines as a means of reducing American casualties in war. However, the

Pentagon is prompted to review its policy in part by a strong bipartisan anti-mine sentiment in Congress, as well as by a growing international campaign to ban interpersonnel mines. Pentagon officials also say Shalikashvili acted after he and Perry received a confidential letter from Albright, who had returned from a trip to Angola, a country that has suffered severe civilian casualties as the result of land mines. (*The New York Times*, 03/17/1996)

April

Shalikashvili reasserts that NATO forces in Bosnia will not pursue suspected war criminals and U.S. troops will be out of the country by December, although the U.S. admiral who commands the NATO operation says he had not decided whether to recommend ending the alliance mission then. Because the Dayton peace accord prohibits war crimes suspects from participating in local elections this year, Shalikashvili expresses confidence that the two most-wanted indicted war criminals in Bosnia -- Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Serb Gen. Ratko Mladic -- will not remain in positions of authority. He also states that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic should be held to his responsibility under the Dayton accord to surrender Karadzic, Mladic and other suspected war criminals to the tribunal in The Hague. (*The Washington Post*, 04/03/1996)

May

After months of internal debate within the Administration about land mines, President Clinton decides to leave largely unchanged the nation's current stance on using the weapons. In the new policy, Clinton embraces most or all proposals endorsed recently by the Pentagon (and Shalikashvili in particular), which supports continuing the use of "smart" anti-personnel mines, which self-destruct after a set time period, until a worldwide ban is negotiated. They also back ending use of "dumb" mines, which remain dangerous indefinitely, after 1999 -but with exceptions to allow such weapons to protect against a North Korean invasion of South Korea, and possibly other circumstances. (*The Washington Post*, 05/16/1996)

Richard Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor for the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, argues that NATO's refusal to order its troops to arrest Bosnian Serb leaders accused of atrocities threatens to undermine the fragile peace in the Balkans. In his first public expression of frustration, Goldstone states that the arrest of Radovan Karadzic, the indicted Bosnian Serb leader, "seems to me not only in the interests of justice but in the interests of peace." In talks with top Clinton Administration officials, including Perry, Christopher and Shalikashvili, Goldstone says he received no encouragement that NATO troops would arrest either Karadzic or Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military leader, who has also been indicted by the tribunal. (*The New York Times*, 05/22/1996)

- June* Terrorists in Saudi Arabia unleash a bomb at the Khobar Towers complex, a U.S. military facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing nineteen U.S. soldiers. The force of the bomb leaves a crater nearly four times larger than the one in front of Oklahoma City's federal building, though the death count is considerably less in the Khobar Tower attack. (*The Washington Post*, 06/28/1996)
- September* The United States launches a cruise missile attack on military and command targets in Iraq in retaliation for its incursion into the northern Kurdish enclave and the town of Irbil. Shalikashvili and Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau, having arrived in the Middle East earlier in the week, continue their diplomatic shuttle through the Middle East. They meet with King Hussein of Jordan and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt after visiting Saudi Arabia the previous day. (*The New York Times*, 09/03/1996)
- November* Shalikashvili states that the Army is conducting a comprehensive investigation to determine how serious a sexual misconduct problem it has in the wake of allegations of abusive behavior by supervisors at a major training facility in Maryland. "We certainly have to assume that it could be happening somewhere else," Shalikashvili says on CBS's "This Morning." "And that's why the Army is casting its net very wide all across the Army, and certainly all training centers, to get to the bottom of this." (*The Washington Post*, 11/12/1996)
- President Clinton announces U.S. willingness to participate in a new international peacekeeping force in Bosnia, a step that would reverse a long-standing commitment to bring U.S. troops home from the Balkans within about one year. The President's top foreign policy advisors lay out the case for extending the U.S. military presence in Bosnia for a further 12 months, until the end of 1997. Clinton also outlines his plans for central Africa, where the United States has promised to commit about 5,000 troops, including 1,000 ground personnel in strife-torn Zaire, to an international relief mission. In meetings with his advisors, Clinton asks Perry and Shalikashvili to further refine mission parameters. The Bosnian operation, according to one official, will be designed in a checklist fashion, with incremental goals along the way, and divided into two six-month stages, with a review period in between. (*The Washington Post*, 11/15/1996)
- December* President Clinton nominates Albright to be Secretary of State on the 5th. Clinton also announces the nominations of William Cohen as Secretary of Defense, Anthony Lake as Director of Central Intelligence, and Samuel Berger as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (*Chicago Sun-Times*, 12/05/1996)

In the annual winter meeting of NATO, the U.S. urges its allies to organize a specially-trained police force to hunt down war criminals in Bosnia and remove the pressure of routine policing duties from a slimmed-down peacekeeping force. But the American proposal is greeted with a lukewarm reception from several European countries -- including France and Italy -- that have the paramilitary capability to perform such tasks. Those countries reportedly are worried that such a mission could involve dangerous firefights and subject their forces to reprisals from belligerents loyal to accused war criminals. Shalikashvili declares that such a police force should be created to pursue alleged Bosnian war criminals and thus distance the peacekeepers from potential controversy and the danger of armed retaliation. "I think a way must be found where a police force can be constituted that would take care of those instances where the signatories to the agreement continue to refuse to turn over those war criminals," he states. (*The Washington Post*, 12/18/1996)

1997

- January* Shalikashvili tells Cohen that he intends to step down as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September. His decision to step down would be in keeping with the tradition for Joint Chiefs chairmen, none of whom has served more than two terms. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Kenneth Bacon tells reporters Shalikashvili wants to retire after more than 37 years in the military and would not accept an appointment to a third term. (*The Washington Post*, 01/30/1997)
- April* Cohen and Shalikashvili, while touring East Asia, issue statements questioning North Korea's continuously high military spending in the face of an impending famine. They argue that the Stalinist nation is still spending massive amounts of money on one of the world's largest military machines. In Tokyo, Shalikashvili says that while North Korea has been making encouraging signs toward better relations with the outside world, its military is training more than ever. "The North Koreans have just completed an extensive winter training cycle," he states, noting that their military pilots are conducting exercises much harder than in the past three years. "If they are in such great difficulty, as they claim they are, and if they are in need of assistance, why are they spending their resources on this kind of military exercising? You have to ask yourself." (*The Washington Post*, 04/12/1997)
- July* Cohen, in consultation with Shalikashvili, initially selects Air Force General Joseph W. Ralston to replace Shalikashvili as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, after the media reveals Ralston had an affair in the mid-1980s; to which he admits and withdraws himself from consideration for the post, Cohen nominates Army General Henry H.

Shelton. While shorter on Washington experience than others who were in the running for the top military post, Gen. Shelton has a reputation among fellow soldiers for being particularly steady under pressure and a quick study. Clinton formally nominates Shelton the following day. (*The Washington Post*, 07/16/1997, 07/17/1997)

August

Cohen states that the Air Force General in charge of the housing complex in Saudi Arabia where 19 airmen were killed in a terrorist blast last year had sufficient warning of a possible attack but failed to safeguard his troops. Ending a fourteen-month investigation into the Khobar Towers buildings, Cohen blocks the scheduled promotion of Brigadier General Terryl J. Schwalier as a means for holding Schwalier accountable for not taking such basic steps as establishing an effective alarm system and regularly practicing a plan to evacuate troops from the buildings. Shalikashvili agrees with Cohen's position, saying, "It is reasonable to expect that a commander of his rank and his experience would not have had those lapses." As a result, Clinton accepts Cohen's recommendation that Schwalier's promotion to major general, a two-star rank, be withdrawn. (*The New York Times*, 08/01/1997)

October

Shalikashvili retires and turns over control of the highest military position in the country to Shelton in a full-dress ceremony. Clinton salutes Shalikashvili, awarding him the Presidential Medal of Freedom and hailing him as an exemplary soldier who "always told me exactly what he thought the truth was." Clinton, Vice President Albert Gore, Jr. and a gallery of senior military and Administration officials assemble at the parade ground at Fort Myer in Arlington for the traditional ceremony the Pentagon gives its highest officers when they leave. In his memoir, Clinton says, "He had been a superb Chairman of the Joint Chiefs... I had really enjoyed working with him, He was intelligent, straight-talking, and completely committed to the welfare of our men and women in uniform." Holbrooke adds, "Low-key but forceful, he was less imposing than Powell, and far less of a public figure. But, like Powell, he conveyed confidence and trust.. he was open and friendly, and universally liked by his civilian colleagues. He never tried to strong-arm or overwhelm civilians in a discussion, but simply stated his position and held his ground as long as possible." (Clinton, p. 766; Holbrook, p. 219; *The Washington Post*, 10/01/1997)

GENERAL JOHN SHALIKASHVILI SUGGESTED TOPICS

Prepared by B.J. Bloom

Miller Center, University of Virginia, 11/29/2006

Joining the Administration

- How did you come to meet Bill Clinton? What were your early impressions of him?
- Describe your relationship with General Cohn Powell. What was it like to work with him under both President Bush and President Clinton?

Supreme Allied Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe and NATO

- Discuss the transition from the Bush Administration to the Clinton Administration. Were there any shifts in policy or strategy from Bush to Clinton that you saw in your role as SACEUR or SACNATO? Comment on the challenges in occupying both positions at the same time.
- How were Clinton's early military policies (i.e. gays in the military, bottom-up review) perceived by the command structure in the military? Characterize the relationship between Clinton's civilian policy team and top military personnel.
- Assess your relations with Clinton and with his foreign policy team (Christopher, Aspin, Lake, Powell) during this period.
- What were the key issues you confronted as SACEUR and SACNATO? What were your early assessments of the conflicts occurring in the former Yugoslavia?

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

- Discuss your appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Did you have any discussions with Clinton about his expectations of you in this role? What did you do to prepare yourself for this job?
- How was the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organized during your tenure? Was this different than under your predecessor or from previous administrations?
- What did you understand to be the broad military and security strategy for the Clinton Administration? Did this mark a departure from previous strategies? How did these policies change over time?
- How often did you meet with the President? What were your early impressions of Clinton's grasp of foreign policy? Did these impressions change over time?
- With whom did you work most closely on the Clinton foreign policy team? Evaluate your relationships with other senior officials on the foreign policy team and with key members of the White House staff.
- Discuss your relationships with the Defense Secretaries within the Clinton Administration.
- Compare and contrast the operating styles of Les Aspin, William Perry, and William Cohen.
- Discuss your interactions with major White House offices (Legislative Affairs, Communications, Political Affairs, etc.) and executive departments (State, CIA, NSA, etc.).

- Describe your interactions with Congress. How did this relationship change after the 1994 midterm elections? What issues and events proved most contentious?
- What role did you play in the diplomatic arena? Comment on your trips abroad as an envoy for the Administration.
- Characterize Clinton's relationship with the military during your tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- What role did you have in formulating U.S. and NATO policy in Bosnia? How did your role as SACEUR and SACNATO influence your thinking? Were there any large-scale problems among the NATO allies on how to coordinate defense policies and implement military strategies on the ground?
- How did the nature of NATO change while you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Discuss the challenges you faced with Russia and Eastern Europe on the issue of NATO expansion.
- How did the situations in Somalia and Bosnia affect Clinton's decision to deploy U.S. troops to Haiti? Describe the military's reaction to the Administration's use of troops for peacekeeping operations.
- Comment on your role in the debate over the use of land mines.

The Clinton Presidency in Retrospect

- What do you consider your greatest accomplishments as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
- What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Clinton Administration in the realm of defense and military policy? How would you rate the President as a strategic thinker?
- Comment on President Clinton as a foreign policy leader and as a military leader.
- How should the Clinton Administration be viewed by future historians? What is the legacy of President Clinton's foreign policy?
- Evaluate President Clinton as a world leader. How did foreign heads of state and military commanders view Clinton? Were there any common misconceptions?

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