



*President George W. Bush
Oral History Project*

BRIEFING MATERIALS

Peter Pace

January 19, 2016

Prepared by Rob Martin, Senior Researcher
September 2013

Presidential Oral History Program

MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR CIRCULATED

PETER PACE NEWS TIMELINE

Prepared by Rob Martin

Miller Center, University of Virginia, 09/04/2013

- 1967** Peter Pace graduates from the U.S. Naval Academy. He goes on to join the Marine Corps and serve as a rifle platoon commander in 1968 and 1969 in the Vietnam War. (*The Daily News*, 04/21/2005)
- 2000**
- September* Pace begins serving as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) on the 8th.
- 2001**
- January* On the 26th, Donald Rumsfeld is sworn in as Secretary of Defense. He creates the Senior Level Review Group bringing the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and civilian leadership together. (Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, New York: Sentinel, 2011, pp. 289, 291)
- March* Rumsfeld drafts a memo identifying a personal set of guidelines for committing forces to combat. Pace later says, "This document really makes you feel very, very comfortable and very good that these are the 'tick points' that he's using for those kinds of decisions. The memo does not represent official Bush Administration policy but circulates with a small group of senior officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) and State and is periodically refined. (*The New York Times*, 10/14/2002)
- Summer* The Office of the Inspector General at the Pentagon conducts a probe into the attitudes towards women at the higher levels of SOUTHCOM. (*The Washington Times*, 08/03/2001)
- August* At a press conference in Crawford, Texas on the 24th, President George W. Bush nominates Pace as deputy chairman of the JCS. Bush also announces General Richard Myers as chairman of the JCS. Pace had been under consideration for the chairmanship as well and had been one of five people Rumsfeld had recommended to the president for consideration. Both positions are subject to Senate confirmation. (*The Washington Post*, 08/25/2001, 10/01/2001; *Newsweek*, 09/09/2002)
- September* On the 11th, al-Qaeda terrorists attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Pace is overseas in Colombia at the time of the attacks and quickly flies back to the U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney informs Rumsfeld that the president has given a shoot down order for two airplanes heading to D.C. It is later learned that one plane is a helicopter and the second crashes in Pennsylvania, but the fighter

pilots never received the order. When Bush arrives at Barksdale AFB, he calls Rumsfeld: “I told Don that I considered the attacks an act of war and approved his decision to raise the military readiness level to DefCon Three.” (George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, New York: Crown, 2010, p. 133) Bush visits the Pentagon the next day. (Dick Cheney, *In My Time*, New York: Threshold Editions, 2011, p. 5; Rumsfeld, pp. 337, 351; *Newsweek*, 09/09/2002)

On the 18th, Bush signs the Authorization for Use of Military Force Act allowing him to use force against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Two days later, he addresses a special joint session of Congress declaring there is no longer a distinction between those nations that launch terrorist attacks and those that harbor terrorists. (*The Washington Post*, 09/21/2001)

Pace’s confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services committee begin on the 25th. (*The Washington Post*, 09/25/2001)

On the 30th, Rumsfeld sends Bush a memo outlining an approach for Afghanistan. It incorporates recent Pentagon ideas about compelling state sponsors of terrorism to change their policies through U.S. military and diplomatic actions. In Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance would take the lead in freeing themselves from the Taliban with U.S. aid. (Douglas Feith, *War and Decision*, New York: Harper, 2008, p. 81)

On the 30th, the Pentagon releases the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) detailing U.S. long-term defense requirements and the structure of forces needed to execute them. The review, which was overseen by Special Assistant Stephen Cambone, emphasizes a “capabilities-based” strategy, which focuses on how an adversary might fight, rather than who or where the adversary is. (Andrew Cockburn, *Rumsfeld*, New York: Scribner, 2007, p. 113; <http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf>)

October Pace begins serving as deputy chairman of the JCS on the 1st, becoming the first Marine to serve in this position. As deputy chairman, Pace serves as the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and vice chairman of the Defense Acquisitions Board, as well as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council and the NSC Deputies Committee. Doug Feith, the undersecretary of Defense for policy, represents the civilian side of the DOD on the NSC Deputies Committee. Pace begins attending Rumsfeld’s “Roundtable” meetings held every morning with the deputy secretary of Defense, the undersecretary of Defense for policy, and the chairman and vice chairman of the JCS. Pace and Feith also create and co-chair the Campaign Planning Committee (CAPCOM), the policy planning committee that meets daily to help the Pentagon fight the war on terror more effectively by improving civil-military coordination between Feith’s policy organization and Pace’s Joint Staff. (Feith, pp. 54, 72-74; *The New York Times*, 10/02/2001)

On the 3rd, Rumsfeld approves “Strategic Guidance” instructions for his commanders addressing threats from terrorists who could use WMD, as well as how the U.S. must convince states who support terrorism to sever their terrorist ties. The instructions calls for the Pentagon to work with other government agencies and use multiple methods in a global campaign. (Feith, pp. 84-85)

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan begins on the 7th. The U.S. military, which had had no war plan set up to target the Taliban government or al-Qaeda prior to 9/11, had to move quickly to create a new plan. General Tommy Franks, the commander of CENTCOM and of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, reports daily on the war to Pace, Myers, Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Feith, Rumsfeld’s special assistant, Lawrence DiRita, and Admiral Edmund Giambastiani. (George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, New York: Harper, 2007, p. 208; Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003, pp. 240, 286; Feith, p. 88, 96; Rumsfeld, pp. 375, 393-394)

On the 9th, Pace attends a Deputies Committee meeting where they discuss whether the U.S. should try to restrain the Northern Alliance fighters from taking Kabul before the winter. The CIA reportedly fears that if the Northern Alliance advances too quickly it could trigger a civil war by alienating the Pashtuns in the South. Reportedly State likes the idea of having more time to train the Northern Alliance fighters, but Pace, Myers, Rumsfeld, and Cheney support encouraging the Northern Alliance to take Kabul before winter. (Feith, pp. 97-98)

In a memo entitled “What Will Be the Military Role in the War on Terrorism” sent on the 10th, Rumsfeld asks Myers and Pace to find ways to draw more actionable suggestions from the DOD for pressuring the terrorists, beyond the current calls for cruise missiles and aerial bombings. Pace and Feith suggest that actionable intelligence is not coming in fast enough from the CIA and argue that combatant commanders need new plans that could yield actionable intelligence for additional operations. This suggestion later produces a successful DOD proposal for multinational operations using naval forces to intercept terrorists and WMD cargo at sea, which both eliminate terrorist threats and yield more intelligence. Pace and Feith also develop a plan in their daily CAPCOM meetings that would help special operations forces on the ground yield more actionable intelligence, as well as a plan to enable U.S. combatant commands to encourage and assist foreign security forces in attacking terrorists locally. (Rumsfeld, pp. 391-393; Feith, pp. 112-115)

On the 13th, Bush announces U.S. intentions to withdraw from the ABM Treaty within six months. (*The Washington Post*, 12/16/2001)

On the 15th, Feith consults with Pace, Greg Newbold, the Joint Staff’s director of operations, and Wolfowitz to develop a “Military Strategy for Afghanistan.” Rumsfeld is reportedly frustrated with Franks for deferring to the CIA on issues dealing with the pacing of the war and the insertion of U.S. special operations

Forces on the ground in Afghanistan. The strategy paper states that the U.S. would give equal support to the southern tribes and to the Northern Alliance, and that the U.S. was committed to preserving Kabul as a capital for all Afghans. The paper urges the Northern Alliance to begin attacking the Taliban and al-Qaeda with the help of U.S. supplies. (Feith, pp. 104-105)

The first U.S. special operations forces enter Afghanistan on the 19th. (Feith, p. 138)

On the 27th, Pace participates in Rumsfeld's phone conversation with Franks in which they discuss the possibility that U.S. ground forces might have to enter the war should the Northern Alliance be unable to win it on the ground themselves. Pace notes, "Process of organizing for it would be very, very useful... It would become visible and people would know that we're not kidding, we are coming, if you don't change sides now, we are going to continue the process." (Woodward, *Bush at War*, pp. 265-266)

On the 31st, Rumsfeld asks Pace and Feith to prepare a new Afghanistan strategy paper to examine how U.S forces can link with southern tribes and what to do during Ramadan and the winter and post-winter campaigns. Rumsfeld has reportedly not been satisfied with Franks' progress on the updated plan. The Pace and Feith paper argues for an intensified effort, such as driving the Taliban out of a major city, launching a large scale humanitarian effort, and opening a land bridge to Uzbekistan. (Feith, pp. 121-122)

Late Fall Pace and Feith, through CAPCOM, lead a study analyzing which state supporters of terrorism might be responsive to diplomatic and non-military pressures, and which would likely require military means. (Feith, pp. 222-223)

November Feith consults with Pace in drafting a memo to Rumsfeld on neutralizing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorist threats. He offers some ideas short of war such as using Iraqi opposition groups more effectively. Pace continues working with Feith to help conduct a comprehensive review of Iraq policy for Rumsfeld's meeting with Franks on the 27th. Rumsfeld wants the plan to present a range of options for the president's consideration. (<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv>; Feith, p. 219)

On the 13th, Kabul falls as Northern Alliances forces enter the city with some anti-Taliban southern forces. Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell had helped pull together a British-led international coalition under a mandate from the UN Security Council to stabilize the city. (Feith, p. 132)

Also on the 13th, Bush appoints the DOD as the "detention authority" for captured Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners. Pace presents SOUTHCOM's construction plans to build a 2,000-person facility at Guantanamo Bay to Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld asks that the plans be reduced to 400, reportedly arguing he does not want the DOD to

become the “world’s jailer.” (Rumsfeld, pp. 567-568; Feith, p. 160; *The New York Times*, 11/16/2001)

Jalalabad surrenders on the 14th. The Deputies Committee discusses the Taliban’s ongoing losses later that day. Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser, asks how the U.S. should handle a Taliban surrender and cease-fire. Wolfowitz responds that the military mission against al-Qaeda is not over, so a cease-fire would be premature. Feith suggests the U.S. protect its right to intervene if terrorists return to Afghanistan. Pace is reportedly concerned about maintaining U.S. military commanders’ freedom of action while U.S. forces are still on the ground in Afghanistan. (Feith, p. 133)

Pace announces that U.S. warships will begin intercepting ships in the North Arabian Sea suspected of carrying fleeing Taliban and al Qaeda forces. (*The New York Times*, 11/22/2001)

December Rumsfeld signs a memorandum to use eighteen counter-resistance techniques at Guantánamo Bay. (<http://www.findlaw.com>)

On the 5th, the UN holds a conference in Bonn, Germany to agree to a governance plan for Afghanistan. The Bonn Process is ratified by the UN, and Hamid Karzai is named chairman of the interim government. DOD officials support a “smaller footprint” to avoid the U.S. from being seen as occupiers. (Feith, pp. 134, 140)

Kandahar, the Taliban’s seat of power, falls on the 9th.

2002

Early ‘02 Pace begins attending Hadley’s “Deputies Lunches” that meet twice a week in the White House Situation Room to discuss Iraq policy. In addition to being held under extra secrecy, attendance is restricted to a small group consisting of Hadley, Pace, Deputy Secretary of State Dick Armitage, Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman, Wolfowitz, Feith, Cheney’s chief of staff Scooter Libby, CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin, and a single NSC staffer. Feith later notes that whereas pre-9/11 Deputies Meetings often debated regime change vs. containment, after 9/11 it is reportedly accepted that regime change is necessary. (Feith, pp. 237-240)

January The first detainees arrive at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on the 11th.

On the 31st, Rumsfeld calls for reforms to restructure the U.S. military to help it better meet terrorist threats. Pace announces that one specific reform will likely include the creation of a new Northern Command to defend the U.S. homeland and its borders. (*The Washington Post*, 02/01/2002)

- February* On the 7th, Bush announces that the Afghan conflict will be governed by the Geneva Conventions and that the Taliban will receive humane treatment but not POW status. The Conventions will not apply to captured al-Qaeda members. (Feith, pp. 162-165; Philippe Sands, *Torture Team*, New York: Palgrave, 2008, p. 33)
- On the 28th, Rumsfeld and Myers review the Iraq war plans with identified targets. (Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, pp. 109-111)
- April* On the 17th, Rumsfeld announces the creation of the U.S. Northern Command that would support civilian authority in the case of another domestic terrorist attack. (*The Washington Post*, 04/18/2002)
- On the 29th, Pace and the Deputies Committee teleconferences with Franks and Zalmay Khalilzad, Bush's special envoy in Kabul, to discuss the conflict between Karzai and Pacha Khan, an Afghan warlord. Pace asks if any Afghans were requesting U.S. help. Franks assures the Deputies Committee that no coalition forces had gotten pulled into the conflict. Hadley, Armitage, and McLaughlin raise concerns about Karzai's vulnerability, but Pace and Franks argue it is too early to decide whether coalition action is prudent. The president decides in May not to intervene. Powell, Rice, Cheney and Tenet had reportedly favored intervention while Rumsfeld and Myers opposed it. Ultimately, Karzai is able to convince Khan to stand down. (Feith, pp. 140-146; <http://www.waranddecision.com>)
- May* Pace announces that Army Lieutenant General Dan McNeil will assume responsibilities for the majority of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and that U.S. special forces troops have begun working with several other countries to train an Afghan national army. (*National Post*, 05/15/2002)
- June* Bush announces his proposal to create the Department of Homeland Security on the 6th.
- August* Rumsfeld reportedly disagrees with the prime objective laid out in Rice's paper, "Liberation Strategy for Iraq," of creating a democracy, which would require staying in Iraq for many years. Rumsfeld instead favors eliminating Iraqi threats like Saddam's support for terrorism, WMDs, and hostility towards neighbors. Rumsfeld argues it would be desirable for the Iraqis to have a democracy, but it is up to the Iraqis to create it. Rice revises her paper to include more of the Pentagon's ideas. (Feith, pp. 284-289)
- September* Franks presents to the president and the JCS a detailed set of military options for attacking Iraq.

On the 12th, Bush appears before the UN to call for regime change in Iraq. The address is strongly informed by a series of classified meetings at the White House with Pace, Myers, Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Powell, called “Regional Strategy Meetings.” The purpose of the meetings was to “explore all the elements—regime change, what military options there might be, how the diplomatic process fits in.” (*The New York Times*, 09/21/2002)

The Pentagon announces it has shifted tactics in Iraq to bombing major air defense sites in no-flight-zones, which could help clear the airspace above Iraq for a possible allied attack. Pace notes that the shift in tactics has “degraded the air defense capabilities” of Iraq. (*The New York Times*, 09/17/2002)

The Joint Staff completes “Joint Publication 3-06: Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations,” which incorporates lessons from Somalia, Serbia, and Haiti to revise the military’s urban strategy for fighting in cities. It calls for isolating the city and relying on overwhelming combat power to capture or destroy crucial targets. (*The New York Times*, 10/22/2002)

October

As the Iraq war plans are being adjusted, Pace meets with Rumsfeld, Feith, Wolfowitz, and Franks to review a list of potential problems that could arise during a war with Iraq. The list, later named the “Parade of Horribles,” is discussed by the NSC. (Feith, pp. 332-334)

On the 12th, Congress authorizes the use of military force against Iraq.

Pace and Rumsfeld announce on the 13th that Rumsfeld has asked the military’s regional commanders to redraft their war plans to find ways to mobilize faster. (*The New York Times*, 10/13/2002)

Pace meets regularly with Rumsfeld, Myers, Franks, Feith, and Wolfowitz to discuss war planning in Iraq, as well as how a post-Saddam Iraq should be managed. On October 15th, Feith presents the DOD’s post-Saddam administration plan to the NSC. The plan calls for unity of leadership in which the defense secretary would be in charge of all tasks to complete the military operations and reconstruction. Powell agrees. (Feith, p. 316)

On October 25th, SOUTHCOM’s General James Hill forwards a request to Myers about approving some interrogation techniques beyond the Army Field Manual. The DOD’s general counsel, William Haynes, discusses the issue with Myers and Wolfowitz. On November 27th, Haynes writes a memo to Rumsfeld recommending using only Hill’s Categories I and II and the fourth technique in Category III, but declining SOUTHCOM’s more severe Category III techniques, like waterboarding, fear of death, and severe pain. Rumsfeld approves the memo. (Rumsfeld, pp. 578-579; Sands, p. 92)

December Pace visits Latvia and Estonia to discuss bilateral military cooperation and to study the development of the nations' defense forces. (*Baltic News Service*, 12/03/2002, 12/04/2002)

2003

Early 2003 Pace attends several meetings with Rumsfeld, Myers, Wolfowitz, and Feith debating whether the U.S. should declare Iraq's weapons program to be a material breach of its obligations under a UN Security Council resolution. Rumsfeld reportedly is very hesitant to declare a material breach "unless we are sure of it and we're ready to do something about it." (Feith, p. 340)

January Pace and Feith begin holding CAPCOM meetings more frequently as the Pentagon's and CENTCOM's planning for Iraq intensifies. (Feith, pp. 360-361)

On the 10th, Haynes tells Rumsfeld the techniques used on Muhammed al-Qahtani might be seen as mistreatment. Rumsfeld suspends approval of the additional techniques and orders a panel of military and civilian personnel that had raised concerns about Haynes' December 2002 interrogation memo to review the guidelines. In April, Rumsfeld approves 24 of 35 interrogation methods that are cleared by the panel. Myers and Pace and the service secretaries also sign off on the 24 techniques. (John Yoo, *War by Other Means*, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006, pp. 195-198; Jane Mayer, *The Dark Side*, New York: Doubleday, 2008, p. 234; Rumsfeld, pp. 581-582; Rumsfeld, p. 581)

On the 20th, Bush signs National Security Presidential Directive 24, stating that the Defense Department will coordinate postwar reconstruction in Iraq, including establishing the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). ORHA is led by Lt. General Jay Garner. (Bush, p. 249; Rumsfeld, p. 487)

On the 30th, Bush, Rumsfeld, and the JCS review the final war plans against Iraq. (Rumsfeld, pp. 453-454)

March Rumsfeld begins holding War Council meetings every morning at 7 a.m. to discuss Iraq strategy and current developments around the world. The group includes Pace, Myers, Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Cambone, and other senior DOD officials. After each meeting, Rumsfeld and several top advisers hold a secure videoconference with Franks, the U.S. commander of the war effort in Iraq. (*The New York Times*, 03/19/2003)

Pace attends a meeting with Rumsfeld, Myers, Franks, Wolfowitz, and others where Rumsfeld asks how long will the war in Iraq last. The group's answers range from 7 to 30 days. Pace reportedly says that if the intelligence is correct, the war should take less than a month. Pace later notes that it was an unusual question from Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld himself does not offer a guess. (Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, pp. 325-326)

On the 19th, Bush gives the order to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom. Two fighters drop bombs the next day on Dora Farms where Saddam is thought to be. However, Saddam is not there. (Rumsfeld, p. 460)

Pace attends a meeting with Bush at Camp David on the 22nd, where the group discusses the possibility that the war in Iraq could last longer than expected. Some Republican Guard forces were reportedly expected to negotiate a surrender with allied forces, only to reverse course and continue fighting. (*The New York Times*, 03/23/2003)

Pace announces on the 27th that Iraq has executed American POWs, used women and children as human shields, and pretended to surrender and then opened fire. (*The Australian*, 03/28/2003)

Bush teleconferences with Pace and Rumsfeld's War Council from Camp David on the 29th. The group reportedly discusses the plan to keep pushing towards Baghdad despite facing unexpectedly tough resistance south of the capital. Cheney, Rice, Powell, Tenet, and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card also participate in the teleconference. (*The Washington Post*, 03/30/2003)

April

Appearing on the *Newshour with Jim Lehrer* on the 1st, Pace says that there is no evidence that any senior Iraqi leadership is providing direction to the Republican Guard divisions fighting around Baghdad. (*The New York Times*, 04/01/2003)

Plans to form a national government in Iraq are delayed in favor of a U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that will oversee reconstruction efforts. The CPA reports to Rumsfeld. (Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor*, New York: Crown, 2011, p. 211)

Appearing on ABC's *This Week* on the 7th, Pace announces that hundreds of Iraqi fighters opposed to Saddam are being airlifted into southern Iraq to battle Saddam's remaining army in the region. Pace adds that the fighters will serve as the core of a new free Iraqi national army. The forces were assembled by the Iraqi National Congress from both exile volunteers and volunteers from within Iraq. (*The New York Times*, 04/07/2003)

On the 9th, Baghdad falls. Looting becomes widespread in the city as Iraqi police officers abandon their posts. (Terry Anderson, *Bush's Wars*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 135, 142)

May

On the 1st, while in Kabul, Rumsfeld announces major combat operations in Afghanistan have ended. (*The Washington Post*, 05/02/2003)

Also on the 1st, Bush announces "major combat operations in Iraq have ended," featuring a "Mission Accomplished" banner. (Rumsfeld, p. 497)

On the 7th, Bush announces Paul Bremer as special envoy to Iraq.

On the 16th, Bremer announces de-Baathification. He announces the dissolution of the Iraqi army the following week. (Feith, pp. 425, 433)

June Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on the 19th, Pace and Wolfowitz announce that between 20,000 and 30,000 allied troops from over a dozen countries will be arriving in Iraq in August to replace some U.S. forces. Both Pace and Wolfowitz concede that it has been difficult recruiting allied forces from other countries even after the UN passed a resolution in May clearing the way for other countries to participate. (*The New York Times*, 06/19/2003)

July On the 4th, Bremer sends Rumsfeld a draft strategic plan called “A Vision to Empower Iraqis.” Security is the top priority. He also recommends that the Iraqis write a constitution as soon possible, ratify it, and hold elections. The other goals include economic growth, transition of power, restoring basic services, improving education and housing, and building a welfare safety net. Rumsfeld believes Bremer’s ambitions go beyond the limited scope of the U.S. military. (L. Paul Bremer III, *My Year in Iraq*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006, pp. 115-116; Rumsfeld, p. 513)

General John Abizaid replaces Franks as commander of CENTCOM on the 7th.

Pace and Myers appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee for their reconfirmation hearings on the 25th. During the hearings both Pace and Myers call for the U.S. to take a cautious approach towards the deployment of U.S. forces to Liberia. Powell had called for the speedy deployment of U.S. forces to help secure the region two days earlier. (*The New York Times*, 07/25/2003)

On the 29th, David Kay, a U.S. weapons inspector, tells Bush that he has not found any WMDs in Iraq. (Michael Isikoff and David Corn, *Hubris*, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2007, p. 310)

August On the 14th, a U.S. helicopter accidentally knocks over a religious banner in Sadr City, sparking protests and riots, as violence continues to rise. Bremer sends Rumsfeld a memo about the need to stop Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr. According to Bremer, Rumsfeld tells Bremer not to arrest him until further operational questions are answered. However, Rumsfeld states he was simply asking questions, not stopping him from arresting Sadr. (Anderson, p. 163; Bremer, pp. 135, 136; Rumsfeld, p. 538)

On the 31st, General Geoffrey Miller, the commander at Guantánamo Bay, arrives in Baghdad with a seventeen-member team reportedly to advise General Ricardo Sanchez on how to obtain better intelligence. Rumsfeld is reportedly disappointed by the quality of information coming from U.S. held prisoners in Iraq. (Mayer, pp.

240-241; Senate Armed Services Committee, *Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody*, 11/20/2008)

September

During a trip to Iraq, Rumsfeld reportedly emphasizes that the building of Iraq's own security force must go faster. However, Bremer later writes he is concerned because his experts are telling him that they would need at least a year to train the Iraqi force professionally. (Bremer, pp. 156-157, 162)

On the 8th, Bremer publishes an editorial in *The Washington Post*, stating that the CPA will not dissolve until a constitution is ratified and elections are held. Rumsfeld reportedly has no advance knowledge of the editorial. Rice is also reportedly not consulted about the editorial, and she talks to Bush about how the NSC can communicate more frequently with Bremer. (Feith, p. 453; Rice, p. 242; Rumsfeld, p. 524)

On the 10th, al-Sadr's militia attacks a patrol of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Sadr City. According to Bremer, he wants to prevent al-Sadr from entering the city, but Wolfowitz refuses to support al-Sadr's arrest. Violence escalates during the fall and winter. (Bremer, pp. 190, 192)

On the 22nd, Bremer comes to Washington to discuss Iraq strategy. Rumsfeld and Bremer meet for two days. Rumsfeld asks Bremer about dismantling the CPA before a final constitution is adopted, the goal being the middle of 2004. Bremer reports that the Iraqis are not ready. However, Bremer is willing to discuss earlier transition because the Iraqis are pressuring him for it. (Bremer, pp. 170-171; Feith, p. 459; Rumsfeld, p. 525)

Pace announces on the 24th that the DOD might have to call up National Guard and Reserve troops for duty in Iraq if the U.S. cannot recruit additional forces from its allied partners. (*The New York Times*, 09/26/2003)

Pace also announces on the 24th that the Pentagon is investigating a possible Syrian-linked spy ring among U.S. Muslim military personnel at Guantanamo. A U.S. Army Muslim chaplain and an Air Force Arabic translator had been arrested the previous week. (*National Post*, 09/25/2003)

Rice chairs the Iraq Stabilization Group to help the NSC coordinate Iraqi reconstruction policy. Rumsfeld, who states he was not consulted about the group's creation, writes a memo to Bush, Cheney, and Card the following week recommending that Bremer report to Rice or State, rather than Defense. The media has been reporting that Rice's group has assumed responsibility for Iraq. (Rumsfeld, pp. 524-527; Rice, p. 242)

October

On the 16th, Rumsfeld writes "the long, hard slog" memo to Pace, Myers, Wolfowitz, and Feith, asking how the U.S. should frame its progress in the war on terror. Feith takes the lead in responding to the memo. Rumsfeld runs the ensuing

long-range strategic review of the war on terror through the DOD's entire military and civilian leadership. (Feith, pp. 509-511; *The Washington Post*, 10/23/2003)

Pace, Myers, Feith, Wolfowitz, General Walter Sharp, and others meet with Rumsfeld on the 23rd and 24th to help prepare Rumsfeld for his upcoming meetings with Bremer. At the end of the month, Bremer agrees to dismantle the CPA before a final constitution is adopted, the goal being June 30, 2004. Bush agrees to the plan on the 29th. (Woodward, *State of Denial*, New York, Simon & Shuster, 2007, pp. 260-262; Rumsfeld, p. 525; Feith, p. 460)

November Appearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the 5th, Pace announces that the DOD has begun alerting 43,000 National Guard and Reserve troops that they could be called-up for year-long duty in Iraq. (*The New York Times*, 11/06/2003)

On the 4th, Rumsfeld sends a memo to Wolfowitz over possible prisoner abuse inside and outside of Iraq. Rumsfeld states, "I need to have a briefing on detainees in both Iraq and Guantánamo Bay. I am concerned."
(<http://www.rumsfeld.com>)

On the 15th, the CPA and the Governing Council agree to a governance plan in which a national assembly would be elected to draft a constitution. The CPA begins working with the Governing Council to draft an interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law, in early 2004. (Bremer, pp. 213-231)

Rumsfeld announces that Pace has been heading an on-going study, called Operational Availability, to review how technological and other changes can allow the U.S. military to revise its war plans to increase combat efficiency and achieve a faster victory. Pace says that Rumsfeld initiated the review in early 2001. (*The Washington Post*, 11/18/2003)

December While visiting Iraq, Rumsfeld tells Bremer that Rice is in charge of all "political matters." Rumsfeld is skeptical of the effectiveness of this new arrangement because he believes that the NSC has not helped to resolve issues on Iraq in the past. (Bremer, p. 245; Rumsfeld, p. 528)

On the 13th, Saddam is captured. (Bush, p. 266; <http://www.cfr.org>)

2004

January On the 6th, while attending a NATO meeting, European leaders tell Rumsfeld that they are willing to expand NATO operations in Afghanistan. (*The Washington Post*, 02/07/2004)

February On the 6th, Bush announces the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Silberman-Robb

Commission) to look into intelligence errors in the case of Iraq's WMD.
(<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov>)

Mar.-May The coalition faces resistance from Ali al-Sistani and the Mahdi army in Najaf, Kufa, Kut, Sadr City, and other southern cities. As the Fallujah and Mahdi crises continue, Bush agrees to Bremer's suggestion of a differentiated policy: resolve the Fallujah crisis by negotiation and use military force (the "Anaconda strategy") against Mahdi's forces. This period becomes the deadliest up to this point in the war. (Bremer, pp. 310-315, 354)

April Rumsfeld acknowledges that the level of violence in Iraq is worse than he had expected as critics charge that he should have sent more troops to the country. Pace defends the level of troops sent, stating that some flexibility had been built into the plans to allow for the total troop levels to be adjusted as needed. (*The Washington Post*, 04/16/2004)

60 Minutes runs a segment on prisoner abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison. Rumsfeld creates the Office of Detainee Affairs and the Geren-Maples task force to address detainee matters. Pace says that the White House has been fully briefed on the DOD's investigation of the abuses since mid-January. (Rumsfeld, pp. 593-594; <http://www.rumsfeld.com>; *The Washington Post*, 05/07/2004)

May On the 5th, Rumsfeld offers Bush his resignation over the Abu Ghraib controversy, but Bush does not accept it. (Rumsfeld, p. 547)

Appearing before a congressional committee, Pace and Wolfowitz concede that the abuses at Abu Ghraib violate the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners. (*The Toronto Star*, 05/14/2004)

On the 25th, Feith, Pace, Rumsfeld, Myers, and Wolfowitz meet with Bush, Cheney, Powell, Tenet, Rice, and other deputies in the Oval Office to discuss the results of the war-on-terror strategy review. Major points include helping other countries with internal security, sharing intelligence on terrorists, and aiding efforts to counter ideological support for terrorism. This strategic review later shapes Pace's March 2005 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, which becomes the foundation for a June 2006 National Security Presidential Directive on the war on terror. (Feith, pp. 509-511)

June Rumsfeld selects General George Casey, Jr. to command U.S. military operations in Iraq. (Bradley Graham, *By His Own Rules*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2009, p. 481)

On the 17th, Rumsfeld admits that he has approved CIA requests for secret detention of suspected terrorists. Rumsfeld argues that Tenet has the authority to order these requests. (*The Washington Post*, 06/18/2004)

On the 28th, the Supreme Court rules in *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* to give enemy combatants the right to contest their detention. The Supreme Court also decides in *Rasul v. Bush* to give foreign nationals at Guantánamo Bay the right of *habeas corpus*. (*The Washington Post*, 06/29/2004)

On the 30th, the appointed interim government in Iraq, headed by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, takes over sovereignty. The CPA ceases to exist. (Rumsfeld, p. 539)

August

On the 16th, Bush announces the global U.S. forces realignment will be more flexible to reach different hot spots. The U.S. will pull some troops out of Europe and Asia, eliminate a number of large, full-service Cold War bases, and construct smaller ones in the Middle East and the Pacific Rim. (Graham, p. 506; *The Washington Post*, 03/25/2004)

Appearing before a House committee on the 10th, Pace and Wolfowitz advise caution in implementing intelligence reforms, arguing that any major restructuring must be done so that it does not obstruct the flow of information to troops in the field. (*The Washington Post*, 08/11/2004)

U.S. forces encircle al-Sadr's forces around Najaf, home to one of Shiite Islam's holiest shrines, to step up efforts to eliminate insurgent forces in Iraq prior to next January's elections. Sistani helps negotiate a truce in which al-Sadr's forces agree to disarm and leave Najaf. The interim government agrees to withdraw U.S. and Iraqi forces from Najaf and not to prosecute al-Sadr's forces, leaving al-Sadr free to participate in elections. U.S. and Iraqi forces are credited with avoiding damage to the mosque, but later they are accused of violating the truce and attempting to assassinate al-Sadr. Casey denies having any knowledge of the attempt. (George W. Liebmann, *The Last American Diplomat*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012, pp. 248-249; *The New York Times*, 08/27/2004)

November

Bush orders U.S. troops into Fallujah on the 8th in an attempt to re-take the city from insurgents. Casey argued that retaking the insurgent stronghold is essential to maintaining security during the January elections. The last pockets of resistance in Fallujah are neutralized by December. (Scott McClellan, *What Happened*, New York: Public Affairs, 2008, p. 241; Woodward, *State of Denial*, p. 359)

A week after Bush's reelection, Rumsfeld begins the next QDR scheduled to be released in 2006. The QDR is to be conducted every four years. (Graham, p. 527)

2005

January

Iraq holds elections on the 30th to select a National Assembly to draft a national constitution.

- March* The Silberman-Robb Commission releases its report. It concludes that although there was a major intelligence failure, policy officials did not politicize Iraq intelligence. (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/pdf/full_wmd_report.pdf)
- The DOD completes the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, which draws from Rumsfeld's strategic review to articulate the role the DOD will play in the "long war" on terrorism. The plan helps to inform a June 2006 National Security Presidential Directive on the war on terror. Bush's broader strategic review had been delayed in the wake of the 9/11 Commission's report and the 2004 elections. The unclassified version of the plan is released in February 2006. (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism," February 2006; Feith, pp. 509-511; *The Washington Times*, 02/20/2006)
- The National Defense Strategy is published in March 2005, calling for the military to continue reorienting its forces and procedures to move beyond the Cold War era to allow the military to address a wider range of challenges. It provides the foundation for the 2006 QDR. (<https://defense.gov>)
- April* Bush nominates Pace as chairman of the JCS at a White House press conference on the 22nd. (*The New York Times*, 04/23/2005)
- May* On the 12th, Rumsfeld announces that the plans to close major military bases are fewer than expected due to the war on terror. The plan goes to the Base Realignment and Closure Committee. (*The Washington Post*, 05/13/2005)
- June* On the 27th, Bush rejects a Silberman-Robb Commission recommendation to give the Pentagon more control over covert operations. It will remain with the CIA. (*The New York Times*, 06/28/2005)
- Pace appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee for his confirmation hearings on the 29th. The committee directs Pace to provide unclassified written answers to its questions regarding the readiness of Iraq's military and security forces. Pace has said that only a small number of Iraq's forces are capable of fighting the insurgents without U.S. support. (*The New York Times*, 07/21/2005)
- July* The Senate Armed Services Committee confirms Pace's nomination as chairman of the JCS on the 15th. (*Aerospace Daily & Defense Report*, 07/27/2005)
- August* Bush sends Pace, Cheney, Powell, and former President George H.W. Bush to Saudi Arabia to express condolences on the passing of the "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud." (*The Washington Times*, 08/07/2005)
- Hurricane Katrina hits the Gulf coast. Bush wants to send in troops to help the New Orleans relief effort, but Rumsfeld tells Bush that he can't send active

military for law enforcement. The president could do so if he declared the city in a state of insurrection. The DOD plays a supporting role in the aftermath as Bush deploys 3,000 troops to the city without law enforcement powers. (Rumsfeld, p. 616; Bush, p. 320, 323)

- September* Pace is sworn in as the 16th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 30th. He is the first Marine to serve as chairman, succeeding Myers. Pace is succeeded as deputy chairman by Admiral Edmund Giambastiani. As chairman, Pace serves as the principal military advisor to the president, the secretary of Defense, the Homeland Security Council, and the National Security Council.
- October* Pace provides the president with a reportedly somber briefing on Iraq's slow progress in the development of its army and police force. (*Newsweek*, 12/19/2005)
- Feith's successor as undersecretary of defense for policy, Eric Edelman, formally institutionalizes CAPCOM as the Policy and Strategy Committee on the 27th. CAPCOM is the policy planning committee created by Pace and Feith to help improve civil-military coordination in fighting the war on terror. (Feith, p. 74)
- November* At a press conference on the 29th, Pace challenges Rumsfeld's assertion that the U.S. does not have a responsibility to prevent torture by Iraqi officials. Pace says, "It is absolutely the responsibility of every U.S. service member, if they see inhumane treatment being conducted, to intervene to stop it." (*The Washington Post*, 12/04/2005)
- The Bush administration releases its 38-page policy review, "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" on the 30th. (*The Washington Post*, 11/15/2006)
- December* On the 23rd, Rumsfeld announces a reduction of nearly 7,000 troops in Afghanistan as NATO takes over counterinsurgency missions in the south. (*The Washington Post*, 12/24/2005; *The New York Times*, 12/31/2005)
- Pace begins a weeklong tour of U.S. air and naval bases in the Middle East and Central Asia. (*The New York Times*, 12/29/2005)
- 2006** Pace is awarded the *Patriot's Award* from the Congressional Medal of Honor Society.
- February* On the 6th, the 2006 QDR is released. The congressionally-mandated review directs the DOD every four years to "delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy by defining force structure, modernization plans, and a budget plan allowing the military to successfully execute the full range of missions within that strategy." (<http://www.defense.gov>) The 2006 QDR pays particular attention to the lessons learned from the global war on terror to identify changes that still need to be made, calling for the continued reorientation of forces to become more agile,

rapidly deployable, and fully integrated. The 2006 QDR is heavily informed by the March 2005 National Defense Strategy. (<http://www.defense.gov>)

On the 22nd, al-Qaeda and Sunni extremists bomb the Shiite al-Askari Golden Mosque in Samarra, unleashing waves of sectarian violence. Rumsfeld asks Pace and Edelman to look into an immediate U.S. response. (Rumsfeld, p. 659)

April Pace publicly defends Rumsfeld after six retired generals call for the secretary to resign. (*The New York Times*, 04/16/2007)

June Rumsfeld and Pace first begin discussing possible replacements for Casey and Abizaid in Iraq. Casey has served two six-month extensions in Iraq beyond his initial twelve-month tour and Abizaid had told Rumsfeld that the U.S. needed “fresh eyes” on the situation. (Rumsfeld, pp. 701-702)

Bush signs National Security Policy Directive 46: U.S. Strategy and Policy in the War on Terror, which is reportedly co-titled the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 15. The document is heavily informed by Pace’s March 2005 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, which was first published as an unclassified document in February 2006. NSPD 46 seeks to clarify and coordinate the role different government agencies will play in the war on terror to give each agency a clearer understanding of its mission and how it relates to other agencies. (<https://www.hsdl.org>; Feith, pp. 509-511; *The Washington Post*, 04/16/2006)

The U.S. Supreme Court rules that detainees have a right to due process in *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, a decision that necessitates Congress’s passage of legislation defining procedures for trying the prisoners detained at Guantánamo Bay. (*The Washington Post*, 07/05/2006)

July On the 22nd, Pace meets with Rumsfeld, Casey, Abizaid, Hadley, Meghan O’Sullivan, deputy national security adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan, and Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, to discuss sectarian violence in Iraq and what Iraqi leaders like Prime Minister Maliki are doing about it. They reportedly discuss whether the Iraqis need additional resources and what the U.S. can do to help further stem the violence. (Bob Woodward, *The War Within*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008, pp. 73-79)

August Appearing before a Senate committee, Pace and Abizaid testify that they did not expect the level of violence in Baghdad to be as high as it is and acknowledge that a civil war is possible. Casey tells Pace and Rumsfeld later in the month that he believes more troops in Baghdad are needed to help stem the violence. (Rumsfeld, pp. 698-699; *The Washington Times*, 08/04/2006)

September On the 6th, Bush acknowledges for the first time the CIA’s program of secret detention of terrorist suspects in foreign prisons and the use of harsh interrogation methods to collect intelligence. The president expresses a willingness to work

with Congress to authorize new military commissions and transfers fourteen high-value CIA detainees to Guantánamo. (*The Washington Post*, 09/08/2006)

Pace and Cheney speak at the Pentagon on the 5th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. (*The Washington Post*, 09/12/2006)

On the 25th, Pace initiates a broad review of Iraq and the war on terror. “We have to give ourselves a good honest scrub about what is working and what is not working, what are the impediments to progress and what should we change.” (*The New York Times*, 11/11/2006) Pace brings two or three colonels and captains from each of the services back from Iraq for a 90-day assignment to participate in the review and make recommendations on how best to move forward in Iraq. The group becomes known as the Council of Colonels. Pace later meets with the Iraq Study Group, the commission created by Congress to study Iraqi policy, and works with other similar reviews being conducted within the Bush administration, including an NSC review headed by Jack Crouch, deputy national security advisor. One of the options Pace’s review considers is a surge, which reportedly meets with some opposition from Casey, Abizaid, the Joint Chiefs, and initially Rumsfeld. Rice, who is conducting a separate review at State, also opposes a surge. (Cheney, pp. 440-441; Woodward, *The War Within*, pp. 55-56, 160-161, 175, 264-266; Bush, pp. 363-364, 371, 376; Rumsfeld, pp. 713-715; Rice, p. 506; *The Washington Post*, 11/11/2006)

October Hadley consults with Pace on a paper prepared by William Luti, the NSC senior director for defense, recommending a surge of U.S. forces in Iraq. Bush later writes that he wanted to make sure that a surge was one of the options that was being considered. (Woodward, *The War Within*, p. 170; Bush, pp. 375-377)

On the 17th, Bush signs the Military Commissions Act that establishes military commissions for trying terrorist suspects. (*The New York Times*, 10/18/2006)

On the 20th, Edelman, Rumsfeld, and Pace are briefed by Abizaid and Casey on a military strategy review in Iraq. Rumsfeld raises the possibility of sending more troops to Iraq, but Casey says it is not necessary. (Rumsfeld, p. 702)

Pace participates in a teleconference on the 21st with Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Abizaid and Casey where they reportedly discuss how long before Iraqi forces can assume a larger role in securing the country. (*The New York Times*, 10/22/2006)

November Bush announces Rumsfeld’s resignation following GOP losses in the mid-term congressional elections on the 8th, which mean that both the House and Senate will have Democratic majorities. (<http://www.cnn.com>)

On the 10th, Bush meets with Pace, Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Hadley, Crouch, and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte to discuss strategy in Iraq.

(Rumsfeld, pp. 713-715; Woodward, *The War Within*, pp. 207, 230-236, 244-267; *The Washington Post*, 11/15/2006)

Bush meets in the White House solarium over Thanksgiving weekend with Pace, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Hadley, Crouch, and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to discuss strategy in Iraq. Cheney, Hadley and the NSC staff support a surge to help stem the violence and help the Iraqis train their security forces to take over. Rice still opposes a surge. (Rice, pp. 541-542)

December On the 6th, the Senate confirms Robert Gates as Defense Secretary with a vote of 95-2. (*The Associated Press*, 12/06/2006)

Also on the 6th, the Iraq Study Group presents its findings to Bush. The group posits that the situation in Iraq is “grave and deteriorating” and argues for the U.S. to engage with Iran and Syria over stability in Iraq. However, no suggestions for troop withdrawal are given. (*Radio Free Europe*, 12/06/2006; *USA Today*, 12/06/2006)

Bush meets on the 7th in the Roosevelt Room with a group that includes Pace, Cheney and Rice. The NSC staff presents a compromise position between Cheney and Rice, which Pace argues against. “Either we’re in or we’re not in. Either we’re operating or we’re not operating.” (Cheney, p. 449) Pace is reportedly open to the surge option, though concerns still remain among the Joint Chiefs and commanders on the ground in Iraq. (Bush, pp. 363-364, 371, 376; Rumsfeld, pp. 713-715; Woodward, *The War Within*, pp. 55-56, 160-161, 175, 264-266)

Bush and Cheney meet with Pace, Rumsfeld, and the Joint Chiefs at the Pentagon on the 13th to discuss the surge. Pace had met with Bush two days earlier to inform him that the Joint Chiefs are prepared to support the surge but have some reservations regarding Maliki’s level of commitment, the need for other U.S. agencies to play a greater role in Iraq, and whether the surge would “break the military” by putting too much strain on the troops and their families back home. Rumsfeld later writes that he and Pace work with the Joint Chiefs to help allay their concerns. (Bush, p. 376; Cheney, pp. 451-453; Rumsfeld, pp. 714-715)

Bush announces his support for a surge in an NSC Principals meeting on the 15th. (Woodward, *The War Within*, p. 267)

Also on the 15th, Rumsfeld leaves office. Pace introduces Rumsfeld who gives his farewell speech. (*The Washington Post*, 12/08/2006)

On the 18th, Gates officially takes over for Rumsfeld. (*AP*, 12/18/2006)

Bush quotes Pace’s assessment of the war in Iraq on the 19th, stating, “We’re not winning, we’re not losing.” (*The Associated Press*, 12/24/2006)

Bush asks Gates, who is set to visit Iraq, to report back to him on the possibility of increasing troop levels. Pace accompanies Gates on the trip. They brief Bush at Camp David on the 23rd upon their return. Some reservations reportedly remain amongst the U.S. military commanders in Iraq regarding the surge. Gates also reportedly recommends General David Petraeus to replace Casey as the commander in Iraq. Pace tells Bush that Petraeus and General Ray Odierno, the number two commander in Iraq, would want the full amount of five brigades of troops under consideration in the surge option to be committed to Iraq. (Cheney, p. 454; *The Associated Press*, 12/24/2006; *The Washington Post*, 12/21/2006)

On the 28th, Bush meets with Pace, Cheney, Gates, Rice, Hadley, and Crouch in Crawford, Texas to discuss U.S. strategy in Iraq. (*The Associated Press*, 12/30/2006)

2007

January

The U.S. launches an airstrike against Islamist militias and suspected al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia on the 8th.

In a televised speech on the 10th, Bush announces the U.S. will send more than 20,000 new troops to Iraq to help stabilize the country. Bush also agrees to accept three recommendations from the Joint Chiefs to help allay their concerns regarding the surge. Bush agrees to direct Rice to lead “a surge of civilian resources,” to seek public assurances from Maliki regarding the freedom of U.S. forces to maneuver, and to ask Congress to increase the size of the U.S. military by 90,000. (Bush, p. 377)

On the 11th, Pace and Gates face tough questioning before the House Armed Services Committee regarding the surge. (Bush, pp. 378-379)

The Senate confirms Petraeus as the new commander of forces in Iraq by the end of the month 81-0. (Bush, p. 380)

February

Pace warns that the new Iraq strategy requires that civilian government agencies play a greater role in the reconstruction and political development of Iraq for the strategy to succeed. (*The New York Times*, 02/07/2007)

Appearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the 7th, Pace and Gates testify that Congress is not endangering troop morale by voting on nonbinding resolutions opposing the surge, arguing that the troops are “sophisticated enough” to understand how the political process works. A White House spokesperson had previously suggested that the votes against the surge could endanger morale. (*The Washington Times*, 02/08/2007)

On the 12th, Gates states that the U.S. will cooperate with Pakistan in an effort to secure Afghanistan. He also says that the U.S. does not plan on abandoning its

efforts in Afghanistan and is planning an increased coordinated assault in the country this spring. (*The Associated Press*, 02/12/2007)

Bush says that factions within the Iranian government are supplying Shiite militants in Iraq with roadside bombs used to kill U.S. troops. Pace had previously said that the weapons had come from Iran, but the U.S. was not sure if the government was responsible. (*The New York Times*, 02/15/2007)

A bipartisan group of Senators sends a letter to Gates amid concerns that U.S. troops are not being properly outfitted in Iraq. The letter comes after a January 25th report by the inspector general, which indicates that there may be a shortage of armor in Iraq. (*States News Service*, 02/17/2007)

On the 20th, Gates receives a letter from Democratic and Republican Senators requesting that he look into conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, after a *Washington Post* report suggests that conditions there are deplorable. The head of Walter Reed is subsequently forced to resign and Gates recommends the facility be closed. (*The Associated Press*, 03/02/2007)

March

Pace is criticized for comments he had made regarding homosexuality. He later apologizes, saying he should have focused his remarks on his support for the current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. (*The New York Times*, 03/14/2007)

On the 16th, Admiral William J. Fallon succeeds Abizaid as CENTCOM commander. (*The Washington Post*, 03/17/2007)

Pace visits China, where he says he was accorded greater access to sensitive bases and command posts than any other U.S. military official had ever received. During the trip Pace suggests that the two countries set up a “hot line.” (*The Washington Times*, 03/30/2007)

April

Gates suggests that the U.S. should stop holding terrorist suspects at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and transfer them to the mainland in order to quell global criticism of the U.S.’s terrorism detention policies. (*The Washington Times*, 04/02/2007)

On the 4th, Gates states that increased sectarian violence could occur in Iraq if Congress passes a proposed law that would only allow “targeted” funding for Iraq. (*The Associated Press*, 04/04/2007)

On the 5th, Gates says that the U.S. and Iran are working on an agreement that would allow Iran access to five Iranians detained in Iraq on suspicion of helping the insurgency in Iraq. However, Gates also states that the U.S. is “not inclined” to release the prisoners. (*Radio Free Europe*, 04/05/2007)

On the 11th, Gates informs the U.S. that all active-duty Army troops will be required to serve 15 months in Iraq instead of the usual one-year tours. On the

same day, Gates presses NATO allies for more assistance with both wars. (*The Associated Press*, 04/11/2007; *USA Today*, 04/12/2007)

May Bush vetoes a war spending bill that would set a timetable for troop withdrawals from Iraq on the 1st. (*The Washington Post*, 05/02/2007)

On the 9th, the DOD rejects a proposal by governors that would allow them the ability to command active duty National Guard members during homeland emergencies, such as tornados and hurricanes. (*The Associated Press*, 05/09/2007)

June On the 3rd, Gates warns Turkey not to attack Kurds in northern Iraq. Turkey alleges that the Kurds are using northern Iraq as a base from which to launch terrorist attacks against Turkey. Gates' comments come after a military buildup by Turkey along the northern border with Iraq. Days later, Turkish forces raid northern Iraq. (*The Associated Press*, 06/03/2007, 06/07/2007)

Gates announces on the 8th that he will not recommend that Pace be re-nominated as chairman of the JCS, deciding instead to recommend Navy Admiral Mike Mullen. Gates says he was planning to recommend Pace's re-nomination but changed his mind after several senators indicated the confirmation hearings would be contentious. Gates says that his decision is due to political considerations and "has absolutely nothing to do with my view of General Pace's performance." (*The Washington Post*, 06/09/2007) Giambastiani, the deputy chairman of the JCS, will also retire. (*The Associated Press*, 06/08/2007; *The Washington Post*, 10/02/2007)

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) criticizes Pace for not being candid enough in his testimony on the war in Iraq. The White House strongly rejects Reid's comments. (*The New York Times*, 06/15/2007)

August On the 30th, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report finds that Iraq has made little political progress since the surge. (*The Associated Press*, 08/31/2007)

On the 31st, Bush meets with Gates and the JCS to discuss how long the surge in Iraq should be sustained. (*The Associated Press*, 09/01/2007)

September Pace acknowledges on 14th that he made some mistakes in his early Iraq strategy, such as in his assumption that the Iraqi army would welcome liberation and help play a role in stabilizing the post-war situation on the ground. Otherwise, Pace says he would have recommended larger troop levels be sent to Iraq. However, Pace stands by the decision to go into Iraq. (*The Associated Press*, 09/15/2007)

On the 26th, Gates announces he is sending a fact-finding group to Iraq to examine the role of private contractors in the country. Gates' announcement comes after an incident with Blackwater, a private contractor based in North Carolina, where 11 Iraqi civilians were killed by the company. On the 6th of December, the State Department and Department of Defense reach agreement on new rules and

guidelines for private contractors in Iraq. (*The Associated Press*, 09/26/2007, 10/01/2007, 10/03/2007, 12/06/2007)

Pace gives a speech at Chaminade High School in New York, the high school of the first Marine who had died under his command.

October Pace steps down as chairman of the JCS and retires from the Marine Corps on the 1st after more than 40 years of service. Bush attends Pace's farewell ceremony. During his farewell address, Pace says that some people in Washington "are more interested in making somebody else look bad than they are in finding the right solution." (*The Washington Post*, 10/02/2007)

2008

June Bush presents Pace with the Presidential Medal of Freedom on the 19th.

TIMELINES

- Peter Pace News Timeline, prepared by Rob Martin, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 09/04/2013.
- Timeline of the Bush Presidency, prepared by Justin Peck and Bryan Craig, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 04/30/2010.

SELECTED WRITINGS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY PETER PACE

- “George W. Bush Participates in Welcoming Ceremony for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” *FDCH Political Transcripts*, 10/15/2001.
- “Defense Department Operational Update Briefing,” *Federal News Service*, 11/21/2001.
- “Question and Answer Session Following Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. Peter Pace (USMC) Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies,” *Federal News Service*, 04/03/2002.
- “Newsmaker: Inside Baghdad; the War Next Door; Mystery Malady,” *The Newshour with Jim Lehrer*, 03/31/2003.
- “General Peter Pace Delivers Remarks to the Marine Corps and Naval Institute Seminar on the War against Terrorism,” *FDCH Political Transcripts*, 09/07/2004.
- “Interview with U.S. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Discussing the Military Offensive against Insurgents in Iraq,” *Federal News Service*, 11/08/2005.
- “General Peter Pace (USMC) Delivers Remarks on the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq at the National Defense University,” *CQ Transcriptions*, 12/01/2005.
- “General Peter Pace (USMC) Holds a Defense Department News Briefing,” *CQ Transcriptions*, 11/29/2006.
- “Press Conference with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice; Secretary of Defense Robert Gates; and General Peter Pace, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,” *Federal News Service*, 01/11/2007.
- “Remarks by President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Armed Forces Full Honor Review in Honor of General Peter Pace, USMC, 16th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Michael Mullen, USN, 17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” *Federal News Service*, 10/01/2007.

BACKGROUND ARTICLE

- Michael Useem, *Leading Up* (New York: Crown Business, 2001) pp. 151-180.

VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

- Rowan Scarborough, "Myers Picked to Lead Military," *The Washington Times*, 08/25/2001.
- Douglas Feith, *War and Decision* (New York: Harper, 2008) pp. 72-74, 88-115, 119-126, 130-138, 229-233.
- Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown* (New York: Sentinel, 2011) pp. 565-569.
- Thomas Ricks, "Rumsfeld Cites Terrorism in Call for Military Reform," *The Washington Post*, 02/01/2002.
- Evan Thomas, "Their Faith and Fears," *Newsweek*, 09/09/2002.
- Eric Schmitt and David Sanger, "Threats and Responses: The White House; Bush has Received Pentagon Options on Attacking Iraq," *The New York Times*, 09/21/2002.
- Thom Shanker, "Rumsfeld Favors Forceful Actions to Foil Attack," *The New York Times*, 10/14/2002.
- Bradley Graham, "Publicly Quiet, Privately Influential; Chairman of Joint Chiefs Prefers Working and Speaking Behind the Scenes," *The Washington Post*, 02/28/2003.
- Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004) pp. 325-328.
- Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Threats and Responses: The Defense Secretary; Rumsfeld Seeks Consensus Through Jousting," *The New York Times*, 03/19/2003.
- Douglas Jehl, "A Nation at War: The Marine General; Spokesman Molded by Urban Warfare," *The New York Times*, 04/09/2003.
- Bradley Graham, "Military Alters Plans for Possible Conflicts; Focus is on Ending Wars More Quickly," *The Washington Post*, 11/18/2003.
- Bradley Graham, "Rumsfeld Questions Anti-Terrorism Efforts," *The Washington Post*, 10/23/2003.
- Douglas Feith, *War and Decision* (New York: Harper, 2008) pp. 509-513.

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

- James Lakely, “Bush Chooses Pace for Top Post,” *The Washington Times*, 04/23/2005.
- Jim Garamone, “Senate Holds Pace, Giambastiani Confirmation Hearings,” *American Forces Press Service*, 06/29/2005.
- “Pace Responds to SASC Questions,” *Aerospace Daily & Defense Report*, 07/27/2005.
- Rowan Scarborough, “Military Plots a ‘Long War’ on Terror,” *The Washington Times*, 02/20/2006.
- “National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 02/01/2006, pp. 1-8.
- “Quadennial Defense Review Report,” Department of Defense, 02/06/2006, pp. iii-7, A1-A7.
- Ann Scott Tyson, “Pentagon to Reevaluate Strategy and Goals in Iraq,” *The Washington Post*, 11/11/2006.
- Dick Cheney, *In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011) pp.438-455.
- Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012) pp.506-507.
- George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010) pp. 370-386.
- Thom Shanker, “Chairman of Joint Chiefs Will Not Be Reappointed,” *The New York Times*, 06/09/2007.
- Dick Cheney, *In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011) pp. 459-460.
- Lolita Baldor, “Top General Acknowledges Iraq Mistakes,” *The Washington Post*, 09/15/2007.

PETER PACE SUGGESTED TOPICS

Prepared by Rob Martin

Miller Center, University of Virginia, 09/06/2013

Early Relationship with George W. Bush

- When did you first meet George W. Bush? What were your early impressions of him?
- Tell us about your work as commander in chief of the U.S. Southern Command and the transition from the Clinton to the Bush administration in 2001.

Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

- How did you come to serve as deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)? Did you expect to be nominated? Describe your confirmation process.
- Describe your major duties as deputy chairman. Tell us about your work heading the Joint Requisitions Oversight Council and as vice chairman of the Defense Acquisitions Board. Comment on your work with the NSC Deputies Committee and the interagency process.
- With whom did you tend to work most closely? Tell us about your relationship with Bush. How often would you meet with the president? Describe your relationship with the military and civilian leadership at the DOD, including General Richard Myers, the service secretaries, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith. Comment on military-civilian relations within the DOD and your work with Feith creating the Campaign Planning Committee.
- Discuss Rumsfeld's relationship with the military leadership, including General Tommy Franks. Tell us about Rumsfeld's relationship with Rice, Powell, Cheney, and the president.
- Discuss your experiences on 9/11 and over the next coming days. Comment on the special challenges that it posed transitioning to your new position as deputy chairman in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
- Describe the Bush administration's response to the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing war on terror. Tell us about your work during the war in Afghanistan and in the war on terror.
- Comment on your work regarding detainees, Guantánamo, and the question of POW status.
- What role did you play in the decision to go into Iraq? Tell us about your work in the planning and execution of the war. What were your greatest concerns going into the war? Tell us about your work in the reconstruction and restoration of security in Iraq. Was there notable disagreement within the administration over what our goals in post-war Iraq should be?
- Tell us about your work for Rumsfeld and Bush in conducting broad reviews of the country's long-term strategy regarding the war on terror. What kinds of military reforms did you and Myers recommend to help the DOD adapt to the post-9/11 environment?
- What advice did you and Myers provide to the president regarding the role that the U.S. military should play in the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts?

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

- Describe what led to your appointment to serve as chairman of the JCS. Do you recall having any conversations with the president about his expectations of you in this position? Discuss your responsibilities as the principal military adviser to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense.

- What kinds of changes did you hope to make at the JCS after taking over as chairman? In what ways did you approach your job as chairman differently than Myers?
- How did your relationship with Bush change after you became chairman? Tell us about your relationship with Stephen Hadley and the NSC. Describe your relationship with Rumsfeld, Robert Gates, and the civilian leadership at DOD. Tell us about your relationship with Admiral Edmund Giambastiani and the service secretaries. Comment on the decision to replace General George Casey and General John Abizaid with General David Petraeus and Admiral William J. Fallon and the impact of those changes.
- Discuss the work performed by the Joint Staff. Who else would you typically look to for guidance in advising the president?
- Describe the policy-making process at the DOD and foreign-policy making process within the Bush administration. Which actors had the most influence? What role did Cheney play?
- Discuss your work as chairman in conducting broad strategy reviews of the role the DOD should play in the war on terror, as well as the impact your work had on Bush's June 2006 National Security Presidential Directive on the war on terror. Comment on the role that other departments and agencies, such as Justice and State, needed to play in post-war Iraq. Discuss Paul Bremer's contributions.
- Comment on the interagency process within the Bush administration. How well did the different departments and agencies work together in fighting the war on terror?
- Tell us about your work on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Report.
- Describe your work to restore security in Iraq as chairman. Discuss the strategy review of Iraq and the war on terror you initiated in the fall of 2006. What role did you and the "council of colonels" play in the Bush administration's decision to support a surge in Iraq?
- Tell us about your relationship with Congress. Comment on the challenges in building support for the surge on Capitol Hill.
- What other important issues occupied your time?

The Bush Presidency in Retrospect

- What do you consider to be your most important accomplishments during your time as chairman and vice chairman of the JCS? What were the most challenging parts of those jobs? What were the most rewarding?
- Comment on the significance of becoming the first Marine to serve in these positions.
- Comment on the broad changes you have seen in the structure of the U.S. military and the DOD over the years. Did Goldwater-Nichols go far enough in its reforms to get the four separate services to operate jointly? In what ways are they still too service-specific?
- What were Bush's greatest assets as commander in chief? What were some of the key differences between Bush and the other presidents you have served under? Comment on Bush's leadership in the days immediately following the 9/11 attacks.
- What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Bush presidency with regards to national security and defense?
- What features of the Bush presidency were overlooked or misunderstood by the press?
- How should the Bush presidency be viewed in history?